The context oriented system of corporate wage charge avoidance

Abstract

The Portfolio Investment Framework, the Principal Agent Framework and the Principal Two Agents
Framework of tax evasion, individually or collectively, are inadequate to represent fairly the dynamics of
corporate income tax evasion. These behavior based frameworks are for the prediction of tax evasion
and their usefulness for identifying tax evasion is limited. To bridge the gap between the prediction and
the identification aspects of corporate income tax evasion, this paper presents the Contextual
Framework of Corporate Income Tax Evasion, structured with twelve ideas and thirty five dynamics to
guide and direct future research. With a simple game theory model, the paper promotes the tax audit cutoff policy that incorporates a reward program for the agent of government, ensures audit frequency and
tests independence of the agent from governanceThe Portfolio Investment Framework, the Principal Agent Framework and the Principal Two Agents
Framework of tax evasion, individually or collectively, are inadequate to represent fairly the dynamics of
corporate income tax evasion. These behavior based frameworks are for the prediction of tax evasion
and their usefulness for identifying tax evasion is limited. To bridge the gap between the prediction and
the identification aspects of corporate income tax evasion, this paper presents the Contextual
Framework of Corporate Income Tax Evasion, structured with twelve ideas and thirty five dynamics to
guide and direct future research. With a simple game theory model, the paper promotes the tax audit cutoff policy that incorporates a reward program for the agent of government, ensures audit frequency and
tests independence of the agent from governance