Autocrats’ modes of exit, rents and crisis in Africa

Abstract

Studies analyzing dictators’ in power do not generally distinguish the way through which rulers are
booted out. In consequence, a destabilizing effect is attributed to some variables without specifying
and testing the mechanisms through which this effect may operate. In this paper, we argue that
‘regular’ leadership changes stem from the incumbent’s incapacity to thwart elite defection and
opposition groups coordination through the use of patronage, whereas, ‘irregular’ changes are mainly
brought about by economic collapse and the widespread of poverty. We also analyze the patterns
behind the steady institutionalization of African politics. Data from all African countries between 1946
(or the year of independence) and 2000 permit us to put such general hypotheses under scrutiny and
confirm them using multinomial logistic duration regressions. It is also shown that foreign pressure, aid
conditionality and domestic opposition have been the major determinants of institutionalization of
African dictatorships, making, thus, possible the decrease in the number of irregular ousters.