

Full Length Research Paper

US policy of capitalization and its discontents in Africa: A post-Marxist reading of postcolonial responses in art, film and social 'writings'

Alfred Ndi

University of Yaounde I, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Bambili, Bamenda I, Republic of Cameroon.
E-mail: ndifred@yahoo.com.

Accepted 19 May, 2025

This interdisciplinary paper investigated the impact of US capitalization policy on Africa and the postcolonial responses of Africans to these forces of internationalism by applying post-Marxist theory to a selection of social 'writings', creative works of art and films. It examined the post-World War II environment that necessitated the politics of capitalization by the emerging US Core and its allied powers. It analyzed the impact of capitalization on this environment and found that the policy led to new ideological clashes, widening social gaps, political and economic conditionalities, patron-client regimes, ineffective delivery systems, militarization of aid delivery and new consumerist practices. It concluded with suggestions for new strategic perspectives on how to deliver the capitalization policy in the globalizing context of Africa. It pointed out that social 'writings', creative works of art and films were ideally placed as qualitative sources of data for this kind of research.

Key words: US capitalism, neo-imperialism, new forms of nationalist resistance in Africa, underdevelopment, post-Marxism, new development strategies, creative art, films and social writings.

INTRODUCTION

This interdisciplinary study investigates new forms of discontents of US policy of capitalism in globalizing Africa. In particular, it explores the discursive effects of US foreign policy on the African nation state environment. By applying post-Marxism to selected works of art and film, it demonstrates how US policy of capitalism engendered outcomes that were shifting from the focus on poverty eradication into concerns with new imperialistic expansion and how these preoccupations were deconstructed in the nationalist 'writings' of the continent. While poverty eradication was clearly the basic objective of US foreign policy after the Second World War, the paper argues that this policy 'dialectized' into a new strategy of global expansion as soon as it came into contact with the wider context of ideological warfare being led by the US and its old allies against the threat of communist spread (Boschini and Olofsgård, 2007). So, the paper shows how the foreign policy regime began to 'deflect' from its economic emphasis on poverty eradication into an accent on the ideological problematic of the donor-recipient divide and beyond this neo-

imperialistic dichotomy into new postcolonial nationalistic responses.

The provision of capital aimed at assisting development in Africa has often been presented in US foreign policy discourse as based on the 'certainties' of economic and technological methods. The manifest goal of development assistance in US foreign policy was to enable African recipient states to achieve modernization and self-reliance by setting in place the building blocks of socio-economic progress in order to prevent them from slipping into a dependency situation requiring assistance from the Communist bloc of countries. It was with this goal in mind that bilateral assistance was distributed by the United States Agency for International Development USAID; supplemented by generous contributions to multilateral organizations like the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), project aid, and other forms of technical and humanitarian assistance were given. The US provided African nations states with large-scale military support, trade subsidies and emergency (disaster relief) props through NGOs and international

institutions. However, the paper maintains that despite the fact that this policy was relatively successful in much of post-War Europe (through the Marshall Plan) and Asia (e.g. Japan) during the second half of the 20th century, in Africa, this policy transformed into new discourses of nationalism.

Today, emphasis is put only on the pitiable record of foreign aid programs in the continent: In the fact that Africa is more impoverished now than it was when delivery of U.S. foreign assistance began. For example, the World Bank admitted that 'a number of countries have yet to implement the reforms needed to restore growth. And even among the strongest adjusters, no country has gone the full distance in restructuring its economy' (World Bank, 1994). George Ayittey confirms that 'there is nothing to show for billions in assistance annually, except a multitude of 'black elephants, economic collapse, social disintegration, and political chaos' (Ayittey, 1994). So, on the whole, the US policy of capitalism has remained as ineffective today as it was in the past. But what was often ignored in economic circles, which this paper elucidates, is the fact that, underpinning economic collapse and the development 'impasse' in Africa was a 'bigger picture' that had to do with the 'discursiveness' of nationalist resistance. African creative art and film represent this 'impasse' as emanating from the 'intertwining' of the policy with imperialism and new postcolonial forms of nationalism and social resistance 'writings'. The paper enquires into these new discursive forms of postcolonial nationalism. It sets out to show that creative writings and films can be very insightful in accounting for the US foreign policy as an '*unstable*' narrative. They explain these new narrative trajectories as being the result of the '*undecidability*' of US policy implementation in context.

The strategies of the policy were designed to end poverty but they ended up serving to fulfill other needs like overt objectives of political expansion so that the provision of capital became paradoxically comparable in Africa to the 'resource curse' (Ross, 1995; Tornell and Lane, 1998).

But before investigating the forms of undecidability of the US policy, it would be desirable to briefly discuss the paradigms of the post-Marxist theory.

The paradigms of post-Marxist theory

Poststructuralist Marxism, or post-Marxism, is a theoretical viewpoint within the general critical social theory that revises the important perspectives of Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault on societal constructs such as oppression and racism (Goldstein, 2005). Unlike traditional Marxism, which holds that history is constituted by a class struggle and the common humanity of oppressed groups, post-Marxism takes the picture further by revealing the racial, class, ethnic and sexual divisions of modern society. A defining argument associated with post-Marxism is that Marxism has failed to explain and

respond to the widening of social demands and movements in the 20th century. More specifically, economic determinist and historicist tendencies of the Marxian tradition are argued to have led not only to the demotion of the political sphere, rendered ineffectual as its constitutive autonomy is subsumed to and contained by the necessary and underlying logic of the economy, but also to the confining of what are clearly very different practices and identities into the sterile spheres of 'class politics' and 'class identity.' The latter, in turn, has resulted in the marginalization of those struggles whose demands did not seem to align with what their 'objective class interests' imposed. As a result, the possibilities for building broader alliances against a whole host of social injustices, including the issue of class injustice, are hampered and dissipated. This is the premise on which various scholars within post-Marxism base their argument for why the left in general and Marxism in particular have suffered from a crisis of political legitimacy throughout the 20th century.

Post-Marxism defines the economic determinist and historicist tendencies of the Marxian tradition. What is referred to as economic determinism finds its classical expression in the base-superstructure model in which an essential economic dynamic is assumed to govern the causal interconnections among all social processes as well as the dialectical transformation of the social formation. In this sense, economic determinism provides both the essential principle for the structural unity of the social and its presumed temporal 'law of movement' that governs the transition from one mode of production to another. This law-like dynamic underpins the notion of class struggle as the motor of sociohistorical development and creates the conditions for the proletariat to assume the role of the privileged and universal agent of social transformation. Historicism functions, in turn, through attaching to this law of economic necessity a certain teleological unfolding. Historicism guarantees that the rationally ordered progression of the mode of production evolves towards a classless and antagonism-free society. Post-Marxism defines itself precisely as an attempt to break with these economic determinist and historicist tendencies of the Marxian tradition. It claims to dispense not only with the conventional approach to class struggle as the necessary political manifestation of an underlying economic dynamic, but also with classical Marxism's class reductionist approach to social antagonism.

Post-Marxism's standpoint is that social antagonism and contradiction is not only multiple, that is, going beyond the domain of class struggle and involving new objects of struggle from welfare to ecology, consumption, women's rights, disability rights and so on, but more importantly, it is interminable. In other words, post-Marxism refutes the very idea of the 'finality' of social antagonism, the belief that there would be an eventual elimination of social antagonism in the so-called classless

society. On the contrary, antagonism for post-Marxism refers to the constitutive limit of every social formation. It names the central impossibility of establishing a self-enclosed and harmoniously unified society, an impossibility which at the same time provides the 'locus' for social change as it unsettles all attempts at institutionalizing the social for once and all. The theoretical consequences of the post-Marxian critique are that the constitutive dynamics and effects of social processes are irreducible to some essential determination by the 'economic base;' the 'superstructural' (that is, political and cultural) instances play a constitutive, and not merely supplementary role in the maintenance of economic and social processes; and social antagonism is not only reducible to class struggle, but it is also infinite. There is no necessary and rational logic that secures the unity and the dialectical progression of the social dynamics and consequentially the constitution and reproduction of the social is contingent because the social is subject to the forces of change.

Formation of a new post-War international environment

The decision of the US to adopt a foreign policy of capitalism was prompted by an intense pressure to assist Africa under the rubric of the 'civilizing mission'. For instance, way back in 1921, Rudyard Kipling was already urging the US to 'take up the White Man's burden' of bringing civilization to Africa, regardless of whether Africans wanted this civilization or not. This part of the 'white mans burden' consisted in replicating the British style of colonization and it was versified as follows: 'Take up the White Man's burden, in patience to abide, to veil the threat of terror, and check the show of pride; by open speech and simple, An hundred times made plain to seek another's profit, and work another's gain.' Kipling's versification (1956) was consistent with the orthodox thinking and wisdom of the epoch that was based on Social Darwinism. Social Darwinism had become popular throughout Western Europe and the US that the paternalism behind the mission appealed to many statesmen in the US.

For example, immediately after World War II and the decolonization struggles in Africa during which European colonial states lost their grip over most of their overseas territories, a major change in the evolution of the world economy occurred. US capitalism was erected as a policy in the context of the independence of new nation states in Africa. The policy after the War was motivated by altruistic concerns for the impoverished continent by decades of colonial rule. Hence, when President Harry Truman made his 1949 inaugural speech on 'a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas' (Ruttan, 1996), he was inspired by the effects of the

Kiplingian humanitarian anxieties that had developed over the unacceptable extent of poverty in the Third world. Here, US policy concerns were clearly moralistic as the poet (and others) had demanded and were devoted to liberating huge masses of people from the elementary needs of nature in order to alleviate human suffering (Lumsdaine, 1993).

This policy was now seen as the most efficient instrument that can affect social change profoundly in Africa than, say, the use of military repression, which had been the traditional approach utilized during the colonial past. The emerging intellectual consensus that facilitated the policy was based on the assumption that more benefits would be derived from social change if huge quantities of capital were deployed, as argued by certain scholars (Millikan and Rostow, 1957; Rostow, 1956) than new military conquests. It was reasoned that if the US could allocate capital to developing countries in Africa to solve their economic problems, this could convince 'belligerent' or 'enemy' states against US interests to disincite towards adoption of socialism or disarm their terrorist groups. From this 'logical' perspective, it was preferable to bring about social change in Africa through peaceful means because change brought about through the use of force would be more expensive and inefficient politically, militarily and economically (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992). In this way, recent history was a critical factor that was imputed into the argument of capitalism and new imperialism. US academics and policy decision-makers drew more insights from the experience with Adolf Hitler's Germany, which did not find the capitalist 'status quo' in the international order of the 1930s to its liking prior to World War II. They established that Nazi Germany sought unwisely to change the international situation through the use of its well-equipped military, but the Nazi-directed military failed to serve as an efficient instrument of containment of the global order. And even though, the menace posed by Hitler motivated the western powers to seek peace with Germany in Munich, Hitler's generals preferred to use the military only as threat rather than as real confrontation strategy with the hope that it would break the will of the western powers to fight and precipitate their early surrender.

However, despite this apparent benevolence existing in the notion of the 'White Man's Burden', the unintended 'effects' of capitalism, namely, neo-imperialism greatly outweighed the potential benefits of the US policy. The space that divides capitalism from ideology is very thinly veiled. This is justifiable by the fact that Harry Truman was president of the US, which was also an emerging post-War imperial power supported by its allies in Europe and its ideological, political and economic interests were now increasingly coming under threat from the communist bloc. Hence, at the background of the humanitarian speech by Harry Truman in 1945, was the Cold War between the US and the USSR and the emerging concern was how to stem the spread of communism.

Thus, the expectation was to vigorously promote capitalist economic development. However, there is no economic policy without its corresponding political systems to support it. Thus, after the inaugural 'speech', the focus shifted from provision of aid as an economic policy goal in and for itself aimed at poverty alleviation, to other 'development' goals like democracy, human rights, gender questions, etc, which underpinned the modality of 'tied' aid, in order to facilitate expansion of free market ideology and a global environment hospitable enough to foreign investments. From this moment, the US policy became a strategic tool used by the new emerging power and its allies, to re-contain the African continent, and create spheres of influence in the international order. Based on the construction of public and private institutions such as schools, health services, roads, democracy, good governance, human rights, justice and military administrations, etc, the policy set out not only to fight poverty, but especially to build a cultural and political environment by effecting social change in the new name of 'modernization' in Africa that was conducive to the exigencies of neo-liberal capitalist growth. The foreign policy was thus intertwined with the modernist ideology aimed at social change, namely, from a primitive, traditional stage to a modern phase of high consumerism and industrialization. Although the policy was chiefly economic, as a discourse, it was decoded into the ideology of modernization comprised of a changeable set of ideas and approaches. Among its 'core' ideological precepts was the notion that the state of economic and political advancement enjoyed by the United States and the industrialized west was a universal model, and that it was in the national interest of the U.S., as well as the general interest of all Africans, that steps should be taken to bring the continent up to a comparable level. Foreign aid then gradually became a change-producing strategy for the expansion of the 'core' rather than an end in itself.

After 1945, the choice between capitalism and communism was not easy, especially for newly independent African societies, which aspired to achieve development away from impoverishment imposed by colonial rule. Although liberal capitalism was clearly the preferred model of development in most African societies, the communalistic ways of living in indigenous African societies made communism an equally attractive model and this was more or less adopted subsequently in states like Angola, Benin (for a period of time) and Ethiopia. Consequently, the paper argues that it was also out of the 'jostling' between these different ideological modes that US imperialism grew intensively. Both ideological powers, realizing that any attempt to dominate the world via nuclear war would be self-annihilating and mutually destructive, began to actively provide financial, technical or humanitarian support to needy African Nation states. But in this postcolonial era from 1945, an 'interstitial' space [to borrow Homi Bhabha's (1994) term] emerged to challenge the dominant narrative: The indigenous culture

and traditional societies were not simply dead, they were now taking new forms, fighting alien values, adjusting to those that were seen to be useful and transforming those that were pragmatic but harmful. As a result, the potentials of the policy were trapped within this hybridity location of culture characterized by 'structural' interactions that emerged between US imperialism and the new nation states in Africa. These interactions constrained Africa's chances to 'develop' in the modernization sense.

African writings show that the imperialization of Africa did not follow a linear trajectory as Kipling had requested and the economic experts of capital had predicted. It was from the late 1960s and 1970s that African writers such as Tsitsi Dangarembga's (1988) *Nervous Conditions*, Flora Nwapa's *Efuru* (1966) turned explicitly to ideas borrowed from European modernism in order to represent the crisis of modernism. The imperative for this self-conscious move to modernism was the feeling that the imagination of the nation and the celebration of Africa's past had become so identified with the nationalist project that it was incapable of accounting for the crisis of decolonization. The necessity to break away from the national imaginary and its forms had already been analyzed earlier in works like Jomo Kenyatta's *Facing Mount Kenya* (1938) and during the 1960s in Chinua Achebe's (1960) *No Longer at Ease* and Wole Soyinka's (1978) *A Dance of the Forests*. The new form of US imperialism called modernization was then decoded simultaneously into a critique of modernist realism and a review of nationalism. This analysis became more pronounced in this cluster of writings in which the Utopian claims that had driven nationalism and independence were now being seen as empty 'signifiers', with the history of the modern state becoming a nightmare and the narrative of decolonization itself becoming a tyrannical totality repressing the self-conscious individual and language. In the writings of authors like Ama (1968), *Our Sister Kill Joys* or *Reflections of a Black Eyed Squin*, Ayi Kwei Armah's (1968) *The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born*, Ahmadou Kourouma's (1968) *Les Soleils de l'Indépendance*, and Ngugi Wa Thiong'o (1967) *A Grain of Wheat*, what was at issue was not simply the corruption, illusions and desperations of independence as a neo-colonial order of modernism, but also the imperative to demythologize modernization itself by fracturing the national experience into multiple and dispersed perspectives, insisting on the primacy of the 'subjective' experience over the collective and objective ethnography of progress.

IMPORT SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION LEADS TO CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES

Import substitution industrialization (ISI) was a strategy of capitalism devised by US academic and policy advisers. It was a fitting approach to visions of a luminous industrial

future for the new African nation states. Between 1960 and 1975, when modernization projects commenced in Africa, the ISI was implemented by many African countries, with states taking control over national industrialization in order to protect domestic industries from foreign competition. The goal here was to mobilize enough investment in the domestic sector to achieve the 'big push' believed to be necessary for self-sustaining economic growth. As Asong's (1968) work titled 'Osagyefo The Great Betrayal' shows, state-led development was vigorously followed in Africa and symbolized by the figure of a national leader. In this way, the policy of ISI was equated with the figure of the nationalist fighter, Kwame Nkrumah, and his figure became the policy itself. As a result, policy became the 'signifier' norm in the 1960s, with, for example, President Kwame Nkrumah, implementing a seven-year development plan (1957 to 1966) in order to expand Ghana's national industry, infrastructure and social welfare. Nkrumah mobilized investment capital from export taxes, foreign borrowing, and the sale of electricity produced by the new Volta hydroelectric dam, but he also provided state-sponsored social services such as education and health care. Consequently, as a 'signifier' norm, Ghana's socialist state orientation began to take multiples of other 'contextual' meanings in which the international environment of capital began to conspire to undo what was seen as Nkrumah's socialist visions. His socialism became a troubling 'signified to the capitalist' west and in 1966, he was overthrown in a bloodless *coup d'état* as a 'Marxist conspirator'. Linus Asong portrays this event as a personal tragedy of Sophoclean and Shakespearean proportions; but he also shows that beyond the flaws in the character of the leader, were powerful id-(eo)logical visions competing to control the new international environment of imperialism.. The outcome of this competition was that ensuing regimes in Ghana have since increasingly focused on capitalist development (structural adjustment programmes, good governance, small government, deregulation, etc), but the result has also been increasing poverty for the Ghanaians.

Similarly, as Robert Merle's film titled 'Ahmed Ben Bella' (1967) shows, between 1954 and 1962, the first Algerian, nationalist revolutionary leader, Ahmed Ben Bella, pursued an orthodox Marxist programme, which demolished middle-class traders and bureaucrats with capitalist-modernist views. As explained in the film, Ahmed Ben Bella enforced a policy of communist modernism as opposed to US modernization policy because the capitalist type of modernism was, in his opinion, exploitative. As Ahmed Ben Bella justifies his policy in the film: 'This wonderful county had been at war for seven years and had lost a million dead; it was still scarred and bleeding, and its people were poverty-stricken. It has got to be rebuilt, on new foundations, from top to bottom. Would fate allow me the time in which to

do it?' However, in 1965, fate did not allow him the time: A military 'coup' brought a new leader, Houari Boumédiène, who declared a fusion of socialism, Islam, and Arabic culture. Boumédiène, the anti-hero, became a 'signifying' leader of socialism: He allowed an Algerian Islamic heritage to control sectors like education and culture, but his economic vision was secular and technocratic. Between 1966 and 1971, he nationalized 90% of Algeria's oil and gas industries, as a way of appropriating its natural resources so as to employ the profits generated to develop state-owned industrial enterprises. This vision failed to materialize, and Boumédiène's socialist programme became vulnerable to a rising radicalist Islamicization of Algeria. The film shows that attempts to institutionalize an ISI through the state apparatus was 'signifying' because it was not only offensive to US foreign policy (in comparison with Boumédiène's socialist programme) but the whole post-independence experience produced a sense of estrangement. In addition, Algerians felt alienated from their cultural origins and the Arabic language; they had a deep sense of disquiet which they experienced when they tried to give expression to their ideas in French, while at the same time they tried to 'feel' the advent of this epoch in Arabic. Hence, there was a postcolonial state of perpetual divorce created in Algerians, between the 'head and the heart', and between the 'intellect' and the 'emotions'. This only prepared the grounds for new narratives of nationalism based on Arabic and Algerian identities that destabilized the US policy of ISI.

The more capitalist-oriented examples of national development from the early years of independence in Africa included Kenya and South Africa. Between 1963 and 1978, the Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta, married to a British woman, propped up the 'bourgeoisie' class with government intervention into agriculture, trade, and production, although trade unionists, like Bildad Kaggia, disagreed and proposed a radicalist socialist alternative. Kenyatta eliminated these radicalists from the ruling party, the Kenyan African National Union, and pushed ahead with a programme of state-managed capitalism, a Kenyatta-Mboya agenda of corporate capitalism (referred to as 'African socialism' by Tom Mboya), marked by some qualities of redistribution in traditional societies, state partnering with labour and domestic/foreign capital in the pursuit of capital formation and industrialization. Under the Kenyan ISI, home markets for consumer goods were protected and agreements were made with foreign firms to import essential capital-goods. By 1970, Kenyatta had built up strong agricultural and industrial sectors. As elaborated in his autobiographical piece, 'Suffering Without Bitterness', Kenyatta (1968) rejected calls by African socialists to nationalize property, following a pro-Western, liberal capitalist approach in its stead. But this policy which was clearly influenced by his continued friendly relationship with British capitalism

(hence the title of his autobiography), alienated his first vice-president Oginga Odinga an author of the celebrated autobiographical work titled 'Not Yet Uhuru' (1968) that narrates his new nationalist tendencies based on his left-wing policies against colonial rule. But Odinga, and the rest of the elites, soon discovered that under Kenyatta's smooth liberal façade was a politician of stringent and autocratic resolve. Kenyatta brooked no opposition, and over the years several of his critics died under inexplicable circumstances, and a few of his political opponents were detained without trial. Increasingly isolated, Odinga left KANU to form a left-wing opposition party, the Kenya People's Union or KPU, in 1966. But by 1969, the party was banned and Odinga and several other prominent members were in prison. Nevertheless, the postcolonial 'spectre' of the ethnic factor (Kikuyu, Luo, etc) loomed in the background and the post-independence political achievements became volatile 'signifiers' vulnerable to the charge that redistribution was not maximised as it should have been. This then resulted in the 'narration' of a nation of violence (Homi Bhabha's term) in December 2008 because the post-electoral nation state landscape displayed post-colonial national identities that were antagonistic and susceptible to contradiction and conflict.

South Africa pursued a capitalist path to development through the ISI from the 1940s with remarkable economic results. However, with all the developments, industrialization in this country was 'racialized', with the post-1948 apartheid state ruthlessly exploiting the black labour population, stripping them of their human rights and political liberties. Because of racial segregation, the ISI that improved the economy until the 1970s was faced with increasing postcolonial difficulties as international sanctions and nationalist resistance intensified. These postcolonial resistances narrated by Nelson Mandela's (1986) 'No Easy Walk to Freedom', Dennis Brutus' (1978) 'Letters to Martha', and the movie 'Cry Freedom' by Attenborough Richard (1987) based on Steve Biko's nationalistic spirit, aggravated the downward trend in the 1980s, and finally the collapse of apartheid in 1994, when national elections brought the African National Congress to power under Nelson Mandela. Although, the de-racialisation of South Africa was very necessary, the new black majority government was confronted with pressures for a new postcolonial 'Africanization' of the system and the state-oriented approach has been barely managing to meet these new obstacles.

Thus, from these examples, it is clear that the US capitalization policy was not implemented in practice as simply a 'linear' evolutionist process, contrary to the optimism in US modernization and diplomatic circles, but rather was a 'contorted' and 'converging' procedure in which modernization was read more as a convoluted strategy of capitalism. Capitalism became vulnerable to opposing postcolonial narratives of Marxism, socialism, Islamism, Afro-centricism and new forms of ethno-fascist nationalism.

THE WIDENING GAP

The debate on the widening 'gap' between the western 'core' and the African 'periphery' can be traced back to the post-World War II period. The US emerged as world power after the War and as a global power; it found itself confronted with the problem of rebuilding Europe in ruins. But as Nurrudin Farah's (1993) work 'Gifts' shows, this effort often failed because foreign aid itself was a spiritual power in which the recipient surrendered his national, economic, cultural and political integrity to the donor by losing his identity; so, capitalism did not even filter down to those at the bottom of the stratification hierarchy because the masses did not 'exist' anymore than as nullified subjective entities. Consequently, US foreign policy did not take poverty eradication particularly into account. In the social 'writings' of the contemporary epoch, the dialectical process disengaged from poverty so that it was perceived anew not as a 'stain' in the moral conscience of the west, to paraphrase former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, but as a neoclassical problem that would be resolved once the 'benefits' of political/ideological development 'trickled down' to poorer people in Africa. Most of Africa, which belongs to Paul Collier's (2007) 'The Bottom Billion', continued to face the debilitating effects of poverty because of these changes in the western perceptibility of poverty eradication.

In addition to these effects, the delivery of whatever capital was available was mismanaged as Bole Butake (2000) points out in his 'The Survivors' and aid often destabilized the local economies of African countries thereby making locally-produced goods unmarketable. For example, food aid historically did little to support African farmers. Under the 'aegis' of the U.S. Food for Peace program, each year millions of dollars were spent on American-grown food that was shipped to Africa. As Nurrudin Farah (1993) confirms in his prologue to 'Gifts', this system of flooding foreign markets with American food, put local farmers across the continent out of business. With the system called 'Dutch disease,' that is, large inflows of money spent which destroy a country's export sector, home prices were driven up and this made their goods too expensive for export. With large aid windfalls enveloping the fragile developing economies, the domestic currency struggled against US and foreign currencies. This destabilization further undermined the effort to build the national economies internally. As a result, national economic sustainability became problematical. Reliance of national industries on government support was no longer sustainable for long in African countries like Somalia which largely budgeted out of foreign aid. With foreign aid, came the rise of state and international agencies concerned with overseas development. But with state and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Africa moved from its 'beneficiary' status to become a 'target' zone. These international NGOs became the 'metaphors' of security of the US and

its allies, because instability in the African 'periphery' (e.g. failed states like Somalia) was interpreted as a potential 'sign' of disruption in the 'core'.

The domination of the global economic order by the neoliberal capitalist west was then possible because of the creation of conditions of severe poverty in the African 'periphery' (Wallerstein, 2000; Wantchekon, 1999). The consequence of this situation was the emergence of a 'yawning' gap between the 'haves' in the west and the 'have nots' in Africa. However, the response to this 'gap' was not resignation but a postcolonial rethinking of international relations. In the international arena, tensions arose between these two major global groups. African countries affiliated with neutral organizations like the Non-Aligned Movement and demanded the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which they believed would transfer wealth away from the rich states of the capitalist west to the poor countries of the continent or at least stop the 'hemorrhage' of their own wealth to the 'core' countries.

The 'core' countries refused this option and responded with the policy of expanding capitalism which made only a little dent in the problem. As a result, victims of this global economic rigidity and hegemony inducing relations of social 'injustice' in African countries used violence to seek redress against their political leaders, and this weakened their national stability. Global inequality and the deprivation that ensued fuelled conflicts during the Cold War years and generated guerilla warfare in many African countries such as Somalia, Congo Brazzaville, Sudan, Angola and Nigeria in the contemporary epoch. But a more robust postcolonial response to this 'gap' was the call for creation of the United States of Africa by new nationalists like Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi, echoing the dreams of old nationalists like Kwame Nkrumah (1965), who argued that political independence of African countries was not enough, the next stage was to be economic independence.

In a literary experimentation by the acclaimed French-speaking African writer Abdourahman (2006) titled *'Aux États Unis d'Afrique'*, the author turns the international misfortunes of the African continent upside down. In his re-imagined globe, the author maintains that Africa can only regain its economic and political dignity by collapsing the imposed colonial boundaries and geographies. The writer reverses the international order of things by presenting a stream of distressed humanity flows from the capitalist West, from the slums of America and the squalors of Europe, escaping poverty and desperation in order to take refuge in the prosperous United States of Africa. It is in this world, that an African doctor on a humanitarian mission to France adopts a child. Now a young artist (girl), Malaïka, travels to the troubled land of her birth in hope of finding her mother, and perhaps something of her lost self. Her search, which is also deeply poignant, reminds us at every moment of the turns of fate called 'truth'. This Djiboutian writer

imagines a new postcolonial world of exploitative capitalism as one that will turn itself upside down and end up with a war raging between Quebec and the American Midwest, and all of Euramerica ending up as a dark, barbaric hellhole. In contrast, in the newly created United States of Africa, peace and prosperity will reign. In this way, the writer uses art to re-imagine what the global political and economic order might look like if Africa were to swap places with the West. The new international order 'Waberi' creates is driven by the question of 'what if?', that is, 'what if' another world were possible?. In this case, the power of the imagination served as a post-colonial response against the injustices of the contemporary international order marked by migration, humanitarian aid organizations draped in arrogance, war, etc.

Capitalization with strings attached

The political interests in US policy usually influenced who got capital and how. While aid programmes in past decades were geared towards reducing poverty, reforms in recipient countries were being imposed through 'conditionality' practices, which required that economic and political policy changes should be effected in exchange for aid. For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation created by the US administration in 2003, allocated aid according to a series of indicators such as 'good governance', social service provision and economic freedom. African countries that did not score well on their scale were not eligible; those that scored poorly were then provided with a powerful incentive to improve. Consequently, the development agenda in Africa shifted from, for example, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, to the indicators devised to measure progress towards a culture of capitalism as described in the World Bank's 'Doing Business series' or the 'Wall Street Journal/Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom' (Edwards, 1997; Heatherly, 1981; Heatherly and Burton, 1989; Heritage Foundation, 2006). These new imperial indicators had impressive effects on policymaking in poor African countries, because, by publicizing policy failures in these states and ranking their individual performances on the scale, they legitimated the role of the US to patronize even politically difficult reforms in recipient countries. For example, Caribbean states that contributed 'peacekeeping' troops to help out Haiti during its years of troubled national politics 'signaled' that they expected a generous financial reward from the west 'for' doing so. Haiti itself expected even more, and the administration was obliged to do so, lest its attempt at nation building failed. In this way, co-operation with the US meant adherence to its foreign policies of nation building and loyalty to its policies often meant that African countries had to compromise their own status and positions in the international order.

Capitalism was often tied to specific projects or

objectives that served the interests of the US more than the needs of African countries. It was often used to achieve political objectives. Some recipient states in Africa faked reform, and donors pretended to penalize them, while the situation of poverty got worse. With increased foreign aid, new strings of conditionalities were attached, so that Africa was now becoming more and more dependent upon the west, and this external dependency was operationalised through other indicators like importation of manufactured goods from donor countries, concentration on raw material production for the west, low levels of goods manufacturing, unfavourable terms of free trade, low levels of investment, devaluation of currency (for example, the CFA in 1994), imposition of structural adjustment programmes, poverty eradication papers, debt servicing, increased emigrations, etc. African countries performed and were ranked highly on these indicators of dependency. Foreign aid to Africa was thus misallocated because the ideological priorities of the US and Europe skewed the direction of the aid into sectors that had little to do with the continent's development and had more to do with serving the strategic interests of the western givers. Also, within the context of this ('core'/'periphery') relationship, the foreign aid policy relocated from its developmental orientation into the need to promote the sale of economic, military, technological and cultural products and services from the US to the continent. The policy developed a 'conditionality' characteristic by which aid was tied to the purchase of such goods and services from the donor country.

During the 1980s, this 'conditionality' component became less discrete and took the direct interventionist form of structural adjustment programmes that reduced the value of the policy because they restrained choice and competition in African countries trying to modernize. With this reduction in the competitive value of aid, a certain amount of lethargy stepped into the bureaucratic systems of nation states in Africa, which spawned corruption with aid money being stolen and kept in private accounts of the leaders not in Africa but in the banks of donor countries which gave the aid. Capital was thus diverted from its role of facilitating development into a role of providing incentive for political alliances. Egypt, for example, was beneficiary of the aid 'carrot' on condition that it surrendered to the pressure 'stick' to endorse the Gulf War in the 1990s. In this way, this 'carrot and stick' strategic allocation did not necessarily correspond to the real needs of recipient states in Africa. The global distribution of aid did not follow strict criteria of absolute developmental need but was biased in the sense that it was given to countries with 'good policy' practices. Consequently, it generated a new political and economic configuration, a core-periphery structure, which followed a certain neo-colonial historisation of the international order between donors and recipients, as described by Galtung (1971). In this globalizing moment, capital became a strategy not chiefly for reducing poverty and

social inequality, but for promoting a 'human rights' culture following standards laid out by the core and this clashed with the notion of 'people's rights' as embedded in the traditions of indigenous societies in Africa. The policy also became an instrument to impose bureaucratic conditionalities on the states, for example, the states were required to reduce the number of functionaries in their public services. Consequently, this promoted new forms of corruption, increased the rate of poverty where the source of revenue was mainly from paid jobs in the governments of most states and weakened the culture of democracy.

Surprisingly, the postcolonial responses to 'capitalization with strings' appeared to be very weak in Africa when one considers some of the prominent authors on this subject. For example, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o responds to the question in 'Devil On the Cross' (1982) by merely proverbializing that: 'to a beggar, a rich man's fart has no smell.'...[and]...the sun never waited for any body, not even a king' (p. 68). Similarly, Nurrudin Farah uses his oeuvre, 'Gifts', to extend the territory of capital beyond Somalia and the Ogaden to an international playing field. Nurrudin Farah maintains that 'gifts' (particularly international aid) inevitably come with strings attached. But he adds that those who benefit more when grain is sent to Somalia during famine, are not the starving Somalis but the American farmers. This is so because to starve is to be of media interest these days. Foreign food donations create a buffer zone between corrupt leaders and the starving masses; they also sabotage the African's ability to survive with dignity. Famine and political unrest in Somalia are only the setting to the more crucial question of gifts within individual families and their influence on the internal dynamics of those families. In 'Gifts', Nurrudin Farah presents the question of 'aid with strings' artistically by portraying the main character, Duniya, as a middle-aged woman twice married, the first time by arrangement to a blind man 40 years older than she. She ends up with three grown-up children who now experience serious problems and find it difficult to live on their own. In order to support herself, Duniya works as a nurse at the Benaadir Maternity Hospital in Mogadishu, as a way of securing financial and emotional autonomy. With two depressing marriages behind her; she was now supposed to enjoy a degree of serenity and stability; but then one day, her daughter returns home with an abandoned baby boy.

This unexpected 'gift' of an abandoned baby boy turn their lives upside down, because it arrives just at the time when Bosaaco, Duniya's former passionate lover comes back home to Duniya to reveal a fundamental 'truth'. The 'truth' is that although Duniya was a wife and a mother, she had never known what it meant to fall in love. Nor had she ever had much of an identity of her own. Therefore, what she has to relinquish in order to have Bosaaco's love is her newly acquired independence. The

dilemma for Duniya is whether she can possibly 'fuse' the two and lose nothing in the process. In this way, in an artistic manner, Nuruddin Farah's 'Gifts' shows us that age is not an impediment to fulfillment and that 'givers' like the US should expect nothing in return from the 'strings' they attach to aid because Duniya's dilemma is very strong. Will she give up her economic independence to devote herself entirely to Bosaaco, the 'American'?

FROM NEW TO OLD CONSUMERIST PRACTICES

The US capitalization policy led to the promotion of new consumerist practices but with 'erasing' old traditions of ingestion. Although, food aid helped Africans to survive in situations of great distress, the US and its allies used it to transform especially urban Africans into consumers of western products and upholders of capitalist lifestyles because, with surplus production of food grains such as wheat, maize and other products like milk and butter in North America and Western Europe, there was the need to create new markets overseas in Africa. Food aid changed the diets only of elite Africans in top administrative positions and created a dependency on the expensive, commodity of wheat bread. African countries spent a substantial part of their foreign exchange earnings to purchase wheat from Canada, the US, Europe, etc, to bake bread to feed those who had assimilated these new consumption habits.

However, the creative discourse shows that dependency does not present the whole picture. One still finds sites of new cultural resistance. For example, indigenous communities in Bole Butake's (2000) 'The Survivors' represented by figures like The Old One resist the new eating lifestyle and, even in distressful conditions, ask for their own local staples and shun the western delicacies as 'products of seduction'. In many 'social writings' of the continent, Africans responded to cultural imperialism by transposing their indigenous forms of consumption into the modern spaces in order to post-modernize/post-peripheralize them. Sometimes, these new social 'writings' or cultural 'scripts' were hybrid nutritional discourses. Whether one was referring to Kenyans gathered in a 'nyama choma' store to consume hunks of grilled meat washed down with generous lager beers, or one was alluding to Ghanaians eating 'fufu' steeped in steaming chicken stew accompanied by soft drinks, one was essentially referring to a communalistic mode of ingestion that is still common in Africa. Africans do not enjoy eating alone as the modern 'script' demands; they eat collectively when it is possible as a response to the new imperial mode of eating as an individual activity. Folktales and traditions in Africa show that there is a culture of eating in the continent. In East and Southern Africa, the base of their staple meals is a dough made from maize flour called 'ugali', 'pap', 'sadza or nsima'. In West Africa, millet is served together with yams or

cassava (manioc) especially in French-speaking countries. In North Africa, bread or rice (couscous algerien, for example) is a delicacy. To this carbohydrate base, is added meat, vegetables, beans or fish sauce. The communal mode of eating involves dipping the base held with one hand into the collective sauce and sitting back to enjoy the meal and watch others dip in their turn.

However, when it comes to drinks, Africans tend to hybridize by using the flavours of their former colonial masters such as coffee, tea, sweet drinks like coca cola and fanta and beer in addition to their own localized beverages. These are consumed in local bars and stores. One finds traditional beer made from maize or millet and drunk during modern public ceremonies, indigenous festivals, etc. Palmwine or 'shaa', a beverage drink from fermented corn, are consumed during funerals and are employed to perform ritual activities. In fact, many African traditions demand that palmwine or 'afofo', a locally produced spirit, should be used during the performance of serious marriage, planting, harvesting, funeral or incantatory rites instead of employing imported delicacies like coca cola, spirits or fanta, which are imperializing drinks. Sometimes, though, the production of local spirits is discouraged with police forces sent out to inspect public places and taxis in order to restrain local entrepreneurship and promote the consumption of imported imperial products.

Poor accountability of delivery systems and patron-client regimes

Although, Africa was one of the greatest beneficiaries of capital from the US, the process of fighting poverty 'hit the rocks' when the institutions, incentives and constraints of assistance induced behaviours and organizations involved in the implementation of its programmes along the lines that could not facilitate effective service delivery (Knack, 2000). After financial and material aid arrived in Africa, corruption and other administrative malpractices invaded the systems of public assistance. In a 2003, UN conference, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, revealed that funds that should have been promoting economic growth and investment, building schools and hospitals or supporting other steps toward the MDGs, were instead being transferred abroad. Thus, although aid was being sent to African countries, there was more money leaving the continent back to the very core or enriching the ruling class in recipient countries as evidenced by Bole Butake's 'The Survivors'. Butake's oeuvre is a reference to corrupt leaders like Mobutu Sese Sekou, the Zairian president from 1965 to 1997, and Sani Abacha of Nigeria (Transparency International Global Corruption Report, 2009).

Foreign capitalization also fueled the patronage machinery. African governments, which received the large percent of their national budgets from the core,

found themselves accountable not to their people but to the core. Domestic patronage is a thematic taken up in Butake's 'The Survivors'. Mboysi, for example, is undignified that the ruling class, represented by Officer, 'is growing rich on our misfortunes' (78). The provision of capital to African states also led to facilitation and maintenance of patronage-client relationships between different ethnic, class, gender and generational groups. This is so because it reduced the need for the states to collect taxes and invest in public projects and, as a result, decreased the requirement for the government to develop accountable political structures (Moore, 1995; Bates and Lien, 1985). Foreign capitalization diminished the necessity for states in Africa to enforce policies that could ease resistance to taxation because such an external source of state finance decreased governments' need for taxes, in the first place. Consequently, long-term dependence on foreign capitalization undermined the quality of governance at a time when 'good governance' was being demanded by the Core. This is so because capitalization diminished the need to collect taxes and reduced the demands for accountability (Brautigam, 2000). Since the Core could not monitor the use of capital, recipient states felt that they could exploit this absence of effective oversight to utilize assistance to preserve and expand patronage arrangements (van de Walle, 2001). Foreign capital supported existing regimes by reducing costs of reform and avoiding reform (Rodrik, 1996). As a result, capital undermined development by relieving demands on rulers to establish the institutions necessary to encourage productive economic activity. Information on patronage was kept discrete because any public revelation of their distribution would have impaired the state's ability to provide resources for selective target groups and could disrupt the provision of further capitalization. Forms of patronage such as special licenses for imports to supporters of the national party, or gaining access to foreign currency at preferential exchange rates, were not quantified and did not appear in the state's accounts. Moore defined foreign capitalization as a source of unearned revenue, and confirms the argument of this paper that accountability declined in Africa as unearned revenue arose (Moore, 1995).

With the decline of accountability, African countries became dictatorships in order to contain communities that were critical of the system and were revolting [for example, epitomized by officer treating the survivors, in their own words, 'like dogs' and 'beggars' (Butake, 2000)]. In this way, capitalization moved from its economic growth focus to moments of legitimacy crisis (van de Walle, 2001; Wantchekon, 1999) because it created redistribution difficulties rather than productive conditions; it engendered centralization of power, patron-client relationships, etc, which, in turn, stalled the construction of accountable political institutions with transparent rules of liberal economic activities. The strategically ideological interests of Core and recipients were clearly more

decisive than any preoccupations with responsible economic policies and poverty eradication; consequently, this weakened, the drive to liberal economic reform, although it spurred certain national segments in favour of development policies and, sometimes, this resulted to conflicts, nationalistic arousal, '*coups d'état*', regime change, etc. Meanwhile, the Core had strong incentives to continue capitalizing African countries even when conditions for this to continue were not being met. This was so because of their strategic interests and because the specter of regime collapse in African countries would have been much more costly to the ideological interests of the Core in terms of the prospects of communism, proletarianism, socialism, nationalism, etc, replacing neoliberal capitalism.

With capitalization, the delivery service was also distorted by the extra spending of recipient countries. Foreign capitalization was now 'fungible'; that is, it led to a 'crowding out' in which recipients reallocated funds that were destined for a purpose now financed by the funders. In this way, foreign capitalization was not used to fight poverty, but to handle strategic goals of the Core and to promote the egoistic interests of the ruling class [for example, Officer selects 'beneficiaries' from among the survivors who should get aid and refuses to account for the source of the aid he is managing on their behalf, Butake, 2000)]. There was a general shift of focus within the institutions themselves, not only in recipient but also in Core countries, as well as the incentives in the entire chain of organizations engaged in the delivery of aid such as Core governments, agencies, consultants, experts and other intermediaries. The interaction of subcontractors within recipient countries, the incentives inside recipient country institutions, and the prejudices in monitoring of aid performance when it came to accounting for its quantity and delivering services, engendered conditions of alienation such as bad governance, corruption, etc. Reforms could no longer take hold because they were not locally owned and aid could not thrive under such conditions of dispossession. .

The advocates of capitalization argued that aid funds were more productive than local spending as it comes packaged with technical assistance and superior management skills of Core agencies and could increase the rate of return on the project, induce changes in policy, institutions, and project design. Yet, aid money crowded-out domestic resources from these activities, and with diversion of domestic spending, it ended up financing different and undesirable activities. The capitalization policy that focused on project financing had unintended consequences. For example, aid that was intended for economic projects was diverted and spent on unproductive projects like defence spending by recipient governments. Consequently, the 1990s became a period of aid fatigue. Faced with their own fiscal problems, the Core began to squeeze their aid budgets. The Core governments and international aid agencies started to

ask new questions about whether their aid was effective in promoting economic growth and reducing poverty,

Core governments and agencies attempted to influence public expenditure policies of recipient government in Africa. The subsidies and grants given only served to induce new individual behaviours (for example, food stamps); and Core funds relaxed the government's budget constraint and finance. Funds that were earmarked for a government ended up as a replacement for other types of expenditures. Food 'stamps' and rent subsidy ended up financing other consumption needs of the populations.

INTERSECTING CAPITALIZATION AND MILITARY EXPANSION

From the policy of capitalization, the US used a dangerous strategy of aid distribution that consisted in utilizing the military to realize foreign assistance missions. For example, in 2006, George Bush signed the National Defence Authorization Act and set up the Commander Emergency Response programme that authorised the military to channel humanitarian relief to distressed citizens in Africa, thereby distorting the distinction between aid and military workers (Bush, 2006; Bush, 2003; African Centre for Strategic Studies, 2008). The model alienated, infuriated and disheartened civilians, and failed to establish strong civil societies and social infrastructure in African states. AFRICOM or the US-Africa Command looks very much like a new imperialisation of Africa in its military version through the disguise of aid: That is, the coveted provision of 'assistance' to Africans in order to fight the 'war on terror'. But, with the benefit of hindsight, this looks like a historical repeat of the militarization of Europe by Germany's Adolf Hitler, and this, at a time when it was acknowledged that diplomacy was a stronger, smarter tool of development than defence. Although, it may seem logical to surmise that distributing aid through the military is a pragmatic solution, nevertheless, as with many other proposed strategies for dealing with terrorist attacks, establishing a clear cause and effect relationship between economic development and terrorism is far from being straightforward. It is not obvious whether the terrorist problem can be resolved through capitalism. Although the terrorists of 11 September, 2001 neither came from nor sought asylum in poor countries; African writers respond postcolonially to this issue by showing that capitalism bred class societies and class societies bred terrorism. In this way, capitalism was contributing to create precisely what US policy was fighting against, namely, terrorism. Capitalism was simply one side of the coin and terrorism the other side. Capital was a 'signifier' that dialectized in Africa into a deeply divided class order which in turn spawned terrorism, the 'signified'.

Laila Lalami who spent about a year in Morocco doing

research on the terrorist attacks that took place there in 2003 and 2007, wrote a novel titled 'Secret Son' (2009). The work of art was inspired by the shifting realities that were created from the social, political, religious and economic complexities of contemporary Morocco. The 'oeuvre' scrutinizes how the Moroccan economy invaded by US and European capitalism created class differences, which led to the spread of social injustice that in turn contributed to a sense of 'alienation' and desperation among the contemporary generation of youths. The work's protagonist, Youssef Mekki, lives in a shack in Casablanca with his mother. He feels that she was concealing something from him, but does not know what it is. His mother told him that his father was a fourth-grade school teacher in the city of Fez, who died on the day of Eid when he was only 2 years old. But Youssef discovers the truth later on, which is that his father was not only still alive, but was a wealthy businessman. He also discovers he lives in a class-conscious society, which does not recognize him because he is the illegitimate son of an upper class man and his mother who comes from a lower class neighborhood. He decides to find his father but realizes that he lives in a politicized society marked by social divides. Youssef enters the luxurious world of Morocco's upper class but a reversal of fortune sends him back to the slum.

With knowledge of both worlds and the injustices they create, Youssef is filled with anger and resentment. Now, he despises the elite class that the departing colonial power had created and left behind them. That elite class, the Frantz Fanonian 'Black Skins', 'White Masks', thinks and treats the population in the same manner as the colonial power used to treat them. With this awareness of the stark differences between the livelihood of the rich elite and the poor, peasant class, Youssef becomes an easy target for a local Islamic fundamentalist group that wants to recruit him for a terrorist attack against a liberal writer. In this way, Lalami's work explores why young people join such terrorist groups and become terrorists. The reasons are multiple, namely, that the group gives them a sense of identity, gives them three meals a day, disseminates an ideology in which they passionately believe or practices a dogma of revenge against the elites who are responsible for the suffering of the ordinary masses. Thus, as Lalami puts it, the total lack of hope for a better life created a bitter feeling of alienation and desperation among disadvantaged young people. For her, 'terrorism' was not simply a dangerous effect from the 'axis of evil' (US president George Bush's term) but it was a postcolonial response to the uncontrolled effects of capitalism.

In Morocco in 2003, there were four coordinated suicide attacks constituting the country's first experience with terrorism, and all of the young men who participated in the attack came from a slum called 'Sidi Moemen' in Casablanca. In 2007, there were some foiled attacks by youths who also came from the same slum background

because very little had changed in the day-to-day life of the slum environment.

CONCLUSION AND NEW PERSPECTIVES

This paper has examined the myriad postcolonial impacts of the capitalization policy in Africa for the past fifty years. It has shown that over the years, instead of fighting poverty, capitalism became entangled in new debilitating circumstances such as ideological clashes, widening social gaps, patron-client and poor accountability and delivery systems, economic and political conditionalities, militarization of aid and new consumerist practices of elites to the detriment of the suffering masses. From this light, the paper suggests that, on the one hand, expectations about the workability of the policy from celebrity advocates like Bob Geldorf, Bono, and Angelina Jolie, environmentalists like Wangari Waathai, politicians like George Bush, Tony Blair, and Gordon Brown, and scholars like Jeffrey Sachs, were good-intentioned but exaggerated. On the other hand, economists and advocates against the policy such as Moyo (2009), and Easterly and Levine (2002) who maintain that aid underwrites 'bad' politics have been too hasty to dismiss its continued (fortunately or unfortunately) relevance today by establishing a direct link between capitalization policy and Africa's underdevelopment. A little digression here suggests, for example, that if anti-retroviral treatments dispensed by the Global Fund or by the Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, supported by the Bush administration, were stopped as they suggested, many Africans would have died prematurely and the economic situation would have even been worse off. In addition, programmes like the Millennium Challenge Account, created in 2004, addressed issues of better governance and practices against corruption, although they were not sufficient to repair the continent's problems, which are profoundly political and ideological.

The paper has gone beyond these 'extremist' quarrels and positions that stress either excessive optimism or a mechanical relationship between capital and development to detail the impact of capital as a neo-imperial, political and class effect (Acemoglu et al., 2001). It considered the ideological place of micro-states in Africa and showed how their interaction with the US materialized into a 'core'/periphery' order, a continuum that prevented even good-intentioned policy options from yielding the anticipated fruits of development. In this way, it suggested that capitalism in itself was and is still critically important without avoiding the need to critically assess the postcolonial ideological environments that predisposed it to failure in the continent. By probing into how the policy's altruistic goals were disentangled by global and ideological concerns, it found that capitalism failed to provide the requisite 'push' for the continent to industrialize and eliminate poverty, not because the

policy was dire in itself, but because, behind its economistic 'rationale', were political, class, racial, cultural and ideological issues as postMarxism rightly enables us to discern. Ideologically, capitalism translated into a new imperial ambition to expand liberal modernism into and 'erase' local indigenous, cultural, political and economic realities of African 'micro-nation states'.

Although, in theory, the policy was initially geared toward catalyzing the economic (GNP) growth of Africa, the 'practical implementation' of the capitalization policy could not escape from the shifting economic and slippery ideological paradigms of the Core. For example, the paradigmatic strategies of the economy changed over time from the one sector, Harrod-Domar, growth model in the Cold War security context (of the 1950s), to the two-gap model (of the 1960s), the employment, basic needs model (of the 1970s), the structural adjustment, stabilization and financial management concerns in the debt crisis context (of the 1980s) and the good governance model in the context of democracy and human rights in the 1990s (Thorbecke, 2000). This is not surprising because the modernist foundations of the neoliberal Core presume, falsely though, that 'primitive' culture cannot be an effective force for implementing modernization.

Therefore, following from these critical illuminations, and in the global context of the new imperialism, if the capitalization policy is to be the effective force for good desired in Africa, the U.S. and its allies would need to adopt a new set of strategies. These should include increase in the amount of capital given, incorporation of faith-based organizations in delivery systems, demilitarization of capital, and the opening up US and European markets to goods of developing countries in Africa. Many concerns have been raised about scaling up the 'quantity' of capital to Africa since the so-called Monterrey Consensus but voices have also been raised about improving the 'quality' of capitalization from the US, UN, G8, European Union, etc, to which this paper subscribes in order to achieve the MDGs. For example, Walt Rostow, motivated by acceleration of Cold War, called for doubling of aid in 1960; World Bank President McNamara called for doubling of aid in 1973. With the end of the Cold War in 1990, the World Bank again called for doubling of aid. World Bank President Wolfensohn called for doubling of aid with the beginning of terrorism in 2001. The G-8 Summit in July 2005 agreed to double aid to Africa whose growth rate remained stuck at zero percent per capita.

This paper suggests that capitalization should not only be tripled, as the Bush administration did, but be quadrupled. If capitalization is increased, this would contribute to close the resource 'gap', accelerate growth and promote the MDGs. Agencies of capital should not be used only to create 'feel-good moments', that is, to satisfy the demands of the donor public that 'something is being done' about poverty. But there should also be an emphasis on the 'quality' of capitalization, that is, the

process of distribution, and this would require elements such as predictability, press freedom, cooperation, etc, to raise awareness and fight corruption in order to improve service delivery and especially 'results'. Such an increase should also be accompanied by technical assistance, ideas, and the promise/actualization of more generous financial assistance in the future if and when the delivery and utilization of old ones improves the lives of ordinary people.

An incorporated strategy into this option would consist in using capital to buy food from farmers within impoverished countries of Africa, and then redistribute that food to local citizens in need. In this way, the local farmers in Africa would be encouraged to produce and the agricultural sector would flourish

It may be necessary to integrate faith-based organizations to help churches and temples in African countries to become the 'communities of character' (Scott, 2004) that can generate the social capital necessary to construct change and development. From this viewpoint of the delivery process, the socialization of capital may be more productive because it would involve direct people-to-people assistance instead of the contemporary government-to-government approach which suggests that capital given to another nation was forcibly coerced from (poor) citizens of the donor country. A people-to-people and even person-to-person exchange system, would bring people together from very diverse back-grounds, cultures and religions. By limiting government-to-government approach, financial and humanitarian resources may be used efficiently instead of being squandered as is the case today. The packages which governments give to other governments spawn repression, tyranny and dictatorship. With the people-to-people approach, a dictator who needs resources from the US or its allies would be accountable to a diverse range of people and would have to plead directly to the donor population and not to their governmental bureaucrats in Washington DC or any other European capital with their own ego interests. This would be a potential embarrassment for a 'dictator' and would compel him to adopt a more humane and civilized behavior toward his own citizens. In this direct system, tensions in the international arena would drop. The role of the state would consist in maintaining polite and cordial relations with other governments, eliminating trade barriers, etc. If the government is in a political crisis, the leader would have to either solve their problem at home, or if he wishes to appeal for capital from foreign countries, then he would have to plead directly to the American, European, etc, people, who would scrutinize his political credentials, rather than the more compromising government. In this way, leaders of recipient African countries would have an incentive to work hard to protect their own citizens. Instead of the monopoly of the World Bank, more private citizens, charities and volunteer groups from the more developed nations could be

employed to play a more significant role in developing the evolving economies. In addition, there would be the need to democratize the giving of capital by incorporating citizens from countries receiving it, so that they have the opportunity to make their say and suggest or even decide how capital should be used. The example of northern Mozambique is a good case where a group of Mozambican and Danish development workers have devised a program based on a local development fund. Through a system of co-operation, policy-makers and ordinary citizens in Mozambique decide together how best they can develop their livelihood.

During the Cold War period, capital was often provided to dictatorial states (for example, Zaire), and when the Core changed their objectives with the collapse of the USSR, debt burdens were left behind to be incurred by successive regimes and repaid by already impoverished African populations. Today, with the war on terrorism raging on, the danger is that the US may endorse dictatorships only for the convenience of it and dump them after the threat has dissipated. The Core countries should support the international financial institutions (World Bank, 1998, 2001) so that they give effective (and selective) economic assistance to African countries and respond in effective ways to new challenges from them such as class inequality, insecurity, debts, diseases, market instability and the degraded environment. In the long term, these measures would encourage economic development, reduce poverty and therefore improve the lives of Africans and make the continent a place less likely to breed underdevelopment, violence and terrorism,.

In the short run, the US, in particular, (and the rest of the western world in general) should immediately open up their markets to raw materials and manufactured products from African countries as a whole instead of favouring only some of these countries through, for example, the so-called AGOA programme. But what is even more challenging today and in the long term is the need for the continent, on its part, to change the structure of its nation state borders, which were arbitrarily mapped out by colonial masters to suit their caprices. Patron-client regimes today are the outcomes of this historical 'error' and, it may even be necessary to adopt 'soft' strategies, like inter-tribal instead of intra-tribal marriages, to incorporate 'micro-nations' (ethnic groups and tribes) into the larger state and continental wholes. In this type of ethnologically divided environment characterized by economic crisis, capitalism would only translate into an ideological and class issue of 'us' versus 'them' as the African creative art, film and social 'writings' show. The author suggest here that future research in the area of capitalism should incorporate this kind of 'qualitative' (and not only quantitative) data because inter-disciplinary (creative art and economic science) studies provide insights that are very helpful in the interpretation of our increasingly complex postcolonial African world.

REFERENCES

- Abdourahman AW (2006). *Aux États Unis d'Afrique*, Lattès, Paris.
- Acemoglu D, Simon J, James R (2001). 'The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation,' *Am. Econ. Rev.*, 91(5): 1369-1401.
- Achebe C (1960). *No Longer at Ease*, William Heinemann, London.
- African Center for Strategic Studies. 'African Center for Strategic Studies Website,' <http://www.africacenter.org>; accessed multiple times since 1 February 2008.
- Ama AA (1968). *Our Sister Kill Joys or Reflections of a Black Eyed Squint*, Longman, London.
- Asong L (2010). Osagyefo. The Great Betrayal, Patron Publishing House, Bamenda.
- Attenborough R (1987). 'Cry Freedom,' Amazon film.
- Ayi KA (1968). *The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born*, Heinemann, London.
- Ayittey G (1994). 'Aid for black elephants: how foreign assistance has failed Africa,' in Doug Badow and Ian Vasquez, eds, *Perpetuating Poverty: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Developing World*, Cato Institute, Washington, pp. 126-145.
- Bates R, Da-Hsiang L (1985). 'A note on taxation, development, and representative government', *Pol. Soc.* 14(1): 53-70.
- Bhabha HK (1994). *The Location of Culture*, Routledge, New York.
- Boschini A, Anders O (2007). 'Foreign aid: an instrument for fighting communism?' *J. Develop. Stud.* 43(4): 622-648.
- Brautigam D (2000). *Aid Dependence and Governance*, Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm.
- Brutus D (1978). *Letters to Martha and other Poems from a South African Prison*. Heinemann Educational Books, London.
- Bueno de M, David L (1992). *War and Reason*, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Bush G (2003). President George W. Bush's Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission. The White House, 30 June. Available at: <http://129.48.104.197/pubs/DR/04%20Chapter.pdf> Accessed on 20 February 2008.
- Bush G (2006). *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White House, Washington, D.C., pp. 10-48
- Butake B (2000). 'The Survivors,' *Lake God and Other Plays*, Editions Clé, Yaounde.
- Collier P (2007). *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, Oxford University Press, London.
- Easterly W, Ross L (2002). 'Africa's growth tragedy,' *Q. J. Econ.*, 112(4): 1203-1250
- Edwards L (1997). *The Power of Ideas: The Heritage Foundation at 25 years*. Jameson Books, Ottawa, Ill.
- Farah N (1993). *Gifts*, Serif, London.
- Galtung J (1971). 'A structural theory of imperialism,' *J. Peace Res.*, 8(2): 81-117.
- Goldstein P (2005). *Post-Marxist Theory: An Introduction*, State University of New York Press, New York.
- Heatherly CL (1981). *Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administration*. Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.
- Heatherly CL, Burton YP (1989). *Mandate for Leadership III: Policy Strategies for the 1990s*. Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.
- Heritage Foundation (2006). *Empowering America: A Proposal for Enhancing Regional Preparedness*. Heritage special report, no. SR-6. Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC.
- Kenyatta J (1938). *Facing Mount Kenya*, London.
- Kenyatta J (1968). *Suffering without Bitterness*, East African Publishing House, Nairobi.
- Kipling R (1956). *Kipling: a selection of his stories and poems*, Vol. 2, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N.Y
- Knack S (2000). 'Aid dependence and the quality of governance,' Working Paper, World Bank.
- Kourouma A (1968). *Les Soleils des indépendances*, Presses de l'université de Montréal, Montréal.
- Lalami L (2009). *Secret Son*, Algonquin Books., Chapel Hill
- Lumsdaine DH (1993). *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Mandela N (1986). *No Easy Walk to Freedom*, Penguin, London.
- Merle R (1967). *Film, Ahmed Ben Bella*, Walker and Co., New York.
- Millikan M, Rostow W (1957). *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy*, Greenwood Press, Westport (Conn.).
- Moore M (1995). 'Death without taxes,' in Robinson and White, eds., *The Democratic Developmental State*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Moyo D (2009). *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York
- Ngugi WT (1967). *A Grain of Wheat*, Heinemann, London.
- Ngugi WT (1982). *Devil On the Cross*, Heinemann, London.
- Nkrumah K (1965). *Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism*; Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., London.
- Nwapa F (1966). *Efuru*, Heinemann, London.
- Oginga O (1968). *Not yet Uhuru*, Heinemann, London.
- Rodrik D (1996). 'Understanding economic policy reform,' *J. Econ. Lit.*, 34(1): 9-41.
- Ross ML (1999). 'The political economy of the resource curse,' *World Politics*, 51(2): 297-322.
- Rostow WW (1956). 'The take-off into self-sustained growth,' *Econ. J.*, 66(261): 25-48.
- Ruttan VW (1996). *United States Development Assistance Policy: The Domestic Politics of Economic Aid*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Soyinka W (1978). *Dance of the Forests*, Heinemann, London.
- Thorbecke E (2000). 'The evolution of the development doctrine and the role of foreign aid, 1950-2000,' in Tarp,
- Tornell A, Lane P (1998). 'Are windfalls a curse?' *J. Int. Econ.*, 44(1): 83-112.
- Tsitsi D (1988). *Nervous Conditions*, ZPH, Harare.
- van de Walle N (2001). 'African economies and the politics of permanent crisis,' Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Wallerstein I (1974). *The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, Academic Press, New York.
- Wallerstein I (2000). *The Essential Wallerstein*, the New York Press, New York.
- Wantchekon L (1999). 'Why do resource abundant countries have authoritarian governments?' Working Paper, Yale University.
- World Bank (1994). *Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- World Bank (1998). 'Assessing aid,' World Bank, Washington, DC.
- World Bank (20010). 'Aid and reform in Africa', World Bank, Washington, DC.